I have known Reginald Armour for a long time - more than thirty years - and although I can say that we are not, and never have been, friends, I can also say that I never had any reason to doubt that his integrity was such that he would not lie, and certainly not so as to attempt to mislead anybody deliberately, much less a Court of Law, whether in Trinidad & Tobago or in any other part of the world. At least, not until now, because the revelations coming out from that Miami court room are , to put it mildly, most disturbing.
But the facts which have come out since a Miami Judge basically said that Mr. Armour should not be a plaintiff in a matter relating to allegations of corruption involving his (Mr. Armour's) former clients concerning the construction of the Piarco airport have given me cause for deep concern. The code of conduct that governs lawyers in this (T&T's) jurisdiction includes an injunction that a lawyer must never mislead a Court. But it seems that Mr. Armour has done just that. Whether he did so knowingly is another matter. He says that because it was almost twenty years ago he couldn't remember. But this had to be one of the biggest cases in his career and this explanation, while it might be true, certainly appears to be unbelievable to the ordinary observer. It was one in which the whole country was extremely interested in and whether he was a junior lawyer confined to taking notes (which he says, but which has turned out to be untrue) or a senior lawyer leading in a defence in a preliminary hearing (which is what appears from the Court records) his position is certainly untenable.
One of the leading cases in apparent bias comes from a case in the 1920's, R v. Sussex. In that case three judges found a defendant guilty of whatever he was accused of (I can't remember what). But it turned out on appeal that the clerk to the Court was in the room when the judges were doing their deliberations. The Court of Appeal held that there was a possibility that the clerk might have influenced the judges in their deliberations although there was no record that he had. But, the Court of Appeal decided, it was dangerous because he MIGHT have done so. So they overturned the conviction. Put another way, a lawyer cannot give advice to Mr. X today and then act for Mr. Y against Mr. X tomorrow in the same matter. (Indeed, a lawyer having advised Mr. X in a matter years ago (and been paid for that advice) ought not to take a case against Mr. X in a different matter today.)
Well, using that logic one can honestly say with hand on heart that there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Armour did use his knowledge from his former position to benefit his new client, the State. But (and you knew that there would be a "but, didn't you?) the POSSIBILITY exists that he MIGHT have. Personally, I doubt that he did, but that ain't the point! The point is in the word "might" and one would expect that this point would be impossible to prove one way or the other. But an Attorney General as the titular head of the Bar must ensure that at all times that nobody can accuse him (or her) in circumstances such as this, of behaving improperly.
So? What should Mr. Armour do? In one word: resign. At the very least there has been a dreadful mistake the responsibility for which must stop at his door. And at the worst? Well, let's not go there.
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